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Attcntion is a nec€ssary comtuct for undcFtanding viroslly cvcry rspcct of second language
acquisition. Both information proccrsing and sociolinguiitic accounts of vtiation assume that
variuion in use is a conscqucncc of variation in Encndon. Atlcntion is ccnral to all accounts of the
d€vclopment of flu€ncy. Undcrstanding L2 dcvclopmcn also invit s the concept of ancntion. Even
assuming a sfong innatcness posilio4 !t lcsst thc triggcrs of innatc loowl€dge must be anendcd to, and
in cognitivc thcorias, asention to input pla)a sn cssrntial role in storagc and hy,pothesis formation.
Attrntion also mcdiates ber*cen individual diffcrcncc fscron tnd SLA in at least thrce ways: attiNdes
and motivation makc a diffcrcncc bccausc motivstcd lcamcrs aicnd more; one dimcnsion of language
rptitude is working mcmory, a oonituct which implics ancntion; md lcaming srarcgies are cither
stratcgics for focusing anention on lnngusgc or for sustaining ancntion whih doing something else in
addition. Lcsrncr-cxtcmal faclon such as osk requircments, task instructions, and all focus-on-form
tcchniqucs (including cxplicit insruction) slso afrccr wbrt is sttcndcd to, thereby causing thcir cffccrs.
The theorcticsl issues dealt with in this papcr are organizcd around the basic assumptions,
dcfinitions, and mctrphors conccming attlntion in the psychological lirerature and include the idea of
stt€ntion as limited capacity, the notion ofsclcctive attcntion, and the role of ancnfon in action control,
acccss io awarcncss, and lcarning. Likc most psychologicsl conccpts initially based on common
cxpcricnce, att€rition does not r€fcr to a singlc mcchanism, but to a variety ofmechanisms with
diffcrcnt functions. These include alcrucss, orientation, prcconscious regisfation (detection without
awarcness), selcction (detection with awarcncss within selcctivc attcntion), facilitation, and inhibition.
This does not diminish the ccntrality ofanention (in its several manifcstations) for learning. Althougb
rccent €videnc€ using the ncgativc priming pandigrn indicatcs thc possibili{ of some unanended
lcarning, this appcan limited in scopc urd rclcvance for SLA, and thcre is lfttle doubt that attended
learning is far supcrior. For all pnctical purposes, ancntion is ncccssary fort all aspccts of sccond
language loarning.
INTRODUCTION
The basic goal of this paper is to sketch-with necessarily broad strokes-part of a
cognitive theory of second language ac4uisition that relies on the m€ntal processes of
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language learners as the basic explanation of leaming.r I am particularly concerned with
those mental processes that are conscious, under the working hlpothesis that SLA is
largely driven by what leamers pay attention to and notice in target language input and
what they understand the significance ofnoticed input to be. This stands in opposition to
what Jerome Bruner (1992) has called the "magical realist,'view, that unconscious
processes do everything.
A full understanding of the ways in which awaneness shapes sLA is beyond the scope -
of this paper, however. Specifically, the issuc ofexplicit and implicit learning (and
related questions conceming the role of explicit and implicit knowledge) in SLA are not
discussed here at any length. Both implicit and explicit learning surely exist, and they
probably interact. Implicit leaming (leaming without awareness) is shown by numerous
demonstrations that the result of allocating attention to stimulus arrays (input) results in
more leaming than can be reported verbally by leainers. Knowledge of the grammar of
one's first language is an obvious case. Native speakers of French "knod'the rules for
using the subjunctive, even ifthey know none of them explicitly. In experimental studies,
it has also been shown that people can learn to control complex systems without recourse
to an explicit mental model of how the system works (Berry, 1994). various theories
have been proposed to account for this basic phenomenon. In SLA, those most discussed
at the present time are the UG account of things, which argues for unconscious deductive
reasoning from irurate principles, and the connectionist account, in which automatic,
implicit leaming results from the strengthening and inhibition of connections in an
associative network, a simple, "dumb" process that leads to a complex and intelligent 
_t
result (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi, & plunkett, 1996). On both
accounts, the leaming is unconscious.
Explicit learning (leaming with awarcness) is also common. probably most readers
have learned a language recently enough to remember some of the experience or have
Iearned some other cognitively demanding skill and can veri$ that leamers commonly
form (conscious) hypotheses about the target of their leaming and modif those
hypotheses as they encounter more information. What these two kinds of leaming,
implicit and explicit, have to do with each other continues to be a topic of great debate
I This paper is a revised version ofa presentation at SLRF '97 (Michigan State University, October l7-19,
1997), pan ofa "point-counterpoint plenary" with Jacqueline Schachter ofthe University ofOregon. This
paper, under the title "Therc is no leaming without anention," was followed by one by Professor Schachter 
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presenting ihc view that multiple types ofevidence for unconscious learning ofvarious kinds converge on
the notion that unconscious adult leaming can and does take place in some though presumably not all areas
oflanguage. A funher r€vision of this paper is to appear in P. J. Robinson (Ed.), Cognition ancl second
language instuctton (Cambridge Applied Linguistics).
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within SLA and elsewhere. In SLA, the question has frequently been posed in terms of
whether or not "learned" knowledge can become "acquired" (Krashen, l98l) or whether
the learner's conscious hypotheses can become intemalized. Another. possibly more
productive way to pose the question is in terms of learning processes (rather than types of
knowledge), to ask whether bottom-up, data driven processing and top-down,
conceptually driven processing guided by goals and expectations (including beliefs and
expectations concerning the target language grammar, phonology, and so on) interact, to
which the answer is probably yes, they do (Ellis, 1994a, 1996a,1996b, tbnhcoming; Carr
& Curran, 1994;Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989;
Robinson, 1995).
'Ihe concerns dealt with in this paper are limited to issues related to the role of
attention in SLA, and as Carr and Curran (1994) have pointed out, there are good reasons
for separating the issues of attention and awareness in learning. Can and Curran argue
that focused attention is required for stnrctural learning to take place, at least when
complicated or ambiguous structures are the objects of leaming, birt allocating attention
to a task does not guarantee conscious awareness of the structural learning that takes
place. At the same time, it is very difficult to separate attention and awareness
completely, because of the conrmon assumption that if you are aware of something you
are attending to it, and if you are attending to something you rue awrue of it (Can &
Curran, lggfi,p. 219). The solution adopted to this problem here is to limit the
discussion of attention and its subjective correlate, "noticing," to awareness at a low level
of abstraction. "Noticing" is therefore used here in a restricted sense, as a technical term
roughly equivalent to "clear perception" or to Tomlin and Villa's (1994) "detection
within selective attention." My intention is to separate "noticing" lfrom "metalinguistic
awareness" by assuming that the objects of attention and noticing L.l"*"nts of the
surface structure of utterances in the input, instances of language, rather than any abstract
rules or principles which such instances may be examples of. Although statements about
learners "noticing [= becoming aware ofl the strucftral regularities of a language" are
perfectly fine in ordinary language, these imply metalinguistic reflection (thinking about
what has been attended and noticed, forming hypotheses, and so fdrth), more than is
implied by the restricted sense of noticing used here2.
I
2 As Truscott (forthcoming) has pointed out, for some in SLA rulos arc consideJed to be the targes of
noticing (R. Ellis, 1993; Fotos, 1994).
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ATTENTION IN CURRENT ACCOUNTS OF SLA
Even a cursory review of the SLA literature indic,ates that the construct of attention
seems to be necessary for understanding virtually every aspect of second and foreign
language learning.
U nde rst an d i n g Variatio n
Mellow (1996) has argued that when non-automatized knowledge is target-like but
automatized knowledge is not, tasks for which attentional resources are abundant will 
-
result in more accurate language use than tasks for which attentional resources are
limited. For example, redundant grammatical elements that have not been automatized
are likely to be omitted in tasks that make high demands on attention such as
comprehension tasks but will be supplied more consistently in tasks such as writing,
which does not make as high demands on attention. Variability can also be induced by
task constraints and instructions. Hulstijn and Hulstijn (198a) showed that performance
on two Dutch word-order rules in a story retelling task improved when the subjects' focus
of attention was experimentally manipulated towards gramm4tical correctness. From a
different perspective, Tarone (1996) has argued that language learners should not be <
viewed solely as decontextualized information processors, emphasizing that social
context (including interactional pressures) is what causes a speaker to pay more or less
attention to one or another linguistic form. However, the information-processing account
and the social variationist account agree that variations in attention underlie variations in
use.
Understanding Fluency
Attention is a key concept in all accounts of the development of fluency (Schmidt,
1992). Models that contrast controlled with automatic processing posit a transition from -
an early stage in which attention is necessary and a later stage (after practice) in which
attentional resources are no longer needed and can be devoted to higher level goals
(Mclaughlin, Rossmil, & Mcleod, 1983; Shiffrin & Schneider,l9TT). According to
Logan's instance theory (1988; Logan, Taylor, & Etherton, 1996), a competitor to the
standard information processing view, the transition to fluency is not the result of
developing automatic routines that do not require attention, but rather the replacement of
slower algorithmic or rule-based procedures by faster memory-based processing.
However, this theory is also based on some crucial assumptions about attention: encoding
into memory is an obligatory consequence of attention (representations in memory are not
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complete and accurate snapshots, but only encode what subjects pay attention to), and
retrieval is an obligatory consequence ofattention at the time of retrieval. Similarly,
chunking theories offluency assume a role for anention; chunking is a mechanism that
applies automatically, but only to attended input (Servan-schreiber & Anderson, l9g6).
c)ther models of fluency emphasize executive control and skilled selective attention.
Bialystok has argued that the basis offluency is the ability to focus attention on relevant
parts ofa problem to arrive at a solution (Bialystok, 1994; Bialystok & Mitterer, l9g7).
U nderstanding Deve lop me nt
Understanding L2 development also invites the concept of attention, although some
accounts emphasize attention more than others. If one is concemed onty with linguistic
competence and subscribes to a strong innateness position, that devetopment is the mere
triggering of innate knowledge, presumably at least the triggers have to be attended to
(schmidt, 1990). within the connectionist position (which does not distinguish between
competence and performance), input and output units are assumed to be attended,
although many accounts are silent on this issue (for one that is explicit, see Cohen,
Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990).
The role of attention is emphasized most in cognitive approaches to lang,,ege
development, such as those of Pienemann ( I 983) and Wolfe-euintero ( I 992), within
which attention to input is essential for storage and a necessary precursor to hypothesis
formation and testing (see also slobin 1973, 1985). common ro thcse approaches is the
idea that L2 leamers process targct language input in ways that are determined by general
cognitive factors including perceptual salience and the continuity of elements (Towell &
Hawkins, 1994).
Peters ( I 998) proposes that in every domain of language leaming (phonology,
grammar, semantics, pragmatics, vocabulary, discourse structuringj, leamers must attend
to and notice any source of variation that matters, whatever makes a difference in
meaning. For example, in syntax, one may say in English both "l tumed the covers
down" and 'I tumed down the covers," but there is no differcnce in meaning that depends
on the position of the direct object. Native speakers do not attend tb this difference, and
non-native speakers do not have to attend to it either, at least for comprehension (to
produce both variants, it is presumably necessary for them to notice each possibility,
unless both are assumed possible based on Ll knowledge). However, if an utterance
contains a pronoun, then there is a differcnce: 'I turned it down" is possible, but "I tumed
down it" is possible only in the sensc of "l tumed down the road," while "l tumed the
road down" makes sense only with the semantic reading of a road bleing offered bur
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rejected as a gift. In this case, Peters argues that leamers do have to notice the difference
in ordering and be aware that it matters (mapping forms with their appropriate meanings). 
-
Moreover, since beginning leamers are cogritively overloaded, they cannot pay attention
to all meaningful differences at once. If they have not leamed what is simple, tley cannot
learn what is complex, but as simpler processing routines are over-learned, they have
more capacity to attend to details, eventually being able to attend to whatever native
speakers pay attention to. In the multidimensional model of Pienemann and Johnston -
(1987), developmental features and natural orders are related to the leamer's processing
space and the freeing of attentional capacity. For example, the crucial point for accurat
production ofthird person -s is that the leamer must have enough processing space
available to generate a third person marker and keep it in working memory until the
appropriate momenl arrives for attaching it to a verb.
In SLA, the proposal that attention is both necessary and sufficient for learning L2
structure has been well expressed by VanPatten (1994):
Bob Smith is a learner of Spanish, a language that actively distinguishes
between subjunctive and indicative mood ... He begins to notice subjunctive
forms in others' speech. He attends to it. Soon, he begins to use it in his own
speech, perhaps in reduced contexts, but nonetheless he is beginning to use it.
If you ask him for a rule, he might make one up. But in actuality, he doesn't
have a rule. All he knows is that he has begun to attend to the subjunctive and
. the context in which it occurs and it has somehow begun to enter his linguistic
system... Bob did not need to come up wit} a conscious rule; he only needed
to pay attention. (p. 34)l
Understanding Indivldual Dilferences -
Attention is a useful construct for understanding individual differences in SLA. As
Tremblay and Gardner (1996) have pointed out with respect to motivation, a statement
that some aspect of motivation leads to higher proficiency or better performance does not
answer the question of why such a relationship exists. Models of motivation and leaming
can be improved by the identification of mediators that explain why one variable has an
t While VanPanen's account is generally in accord with the argument presented in this paper, it could be
made more precise. It is not the "subjunctive" itselfthat needs to be paid anention to, but instances or
exemplars of it. Clearly it is rot necessary that leamers know the label "subjunctive" or thal they have a 
-
metalinguistic rule (though lhis may be helpful). However. ifPeters (1998) is correct in arguing that
leamers must noticc variation that makes a difference, then noticing individual instances should lead to
success in using formulaic unerances with subiunctive forms but fully productive use (when a given verb
can appear in ipanicular context in either subjunctive or indicativc ibrm) would rcguire that leamers attend
to the mapping betwccn forms and meanings.
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effect on another. ln a revised version ofGardner's well-known socio-educational model,
Tremblay and Gardner propose that three motivational behaviors----etfort, persistence, and
attentioF-are the mediators between distant tbctors such as language attirudes,
motivational factors (value, self-efficacy, and goal-salience), and achievement, hnding
support for a LISREL structural equation model linking these variables in a study of
achievement in French courses. In addition, three studies to date (Maclntyre & Noels,
1996; Oxford & Nyikos, 1989; Schmidt, Jacques, Kassabgy, & Boraie, 1997) have found
strong links between motivation and leaming strategies, particularly cognitive and
metacognitive strategies. These stratcgies are either strategies for focusing attention on
some aspect ofthe target language or ior sustaining attention while doing something in
addition-inferencing, looking for pattems, monitoring (paying anention to one's outpur
and to the process of learning itsel$, and other types ofactive conscious processing
(O'Malley, Chamot, & Walker, 1987; Oxford, 1990).
At least one aptitud€ factor, working memory capacity (Baddeley, l9g6; Ellis, 1996a;
Hanington & Sawyer, 1992), is closely related to attention. workirrg memory capacity
refers to the ability to rehearse and process sequential information (for example, repeating
strings of digits or repeating a set of sentences while simultaneously remembering the
final word of each sentence). Robinson ( I 995) has suggested that my concept of
"noticing" can be redefined as dctection plus rehearsal in working memory. Baddeley,
Papagno, and Vallar (1988) have argued that such rehearsal is necessary for leaming
unfamiliar verbal material, although not necessary for forming associations between
meaningful items that are already known.
Andenttndlng lhe Role of Inslruclion
Sharwood Smith (1995) points out that input salience can be internally derived (input
becomes noticeable to the leamer because of intemal cognitive chahges and processes) or
externally derived (input becomes more noticeable because the manner ofexposure is
changed). One likely role ofexplicit instruction is that by changing expectations, it helps
focus attention on forms and meanings in the input, a prercquisite ior subsequent
processing (de Graaff, 1997; N. Ellis, 1993; R. Ellis, 1994; Hulstijt & DeGraaf, 1994;
Long, 1988; Schmidt, 1990; Schmidt & Frota, 1986; Sharwood Smith, 1993, 1994;
Tomlin & ViUa, 1994; Terrell, l99l; VanPatten, 1994). It can be argued that task
requirements, task instructions, and input enhancement techniques affect what is attended
to and noticed in on-line processing, thereby causing their effects (Doughty, l99l ;
Doughty & Williams, in press; Skchan, !996).
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Similar characteristics of informal instruction, ranging from immersion contexts to
natual interaction with native speakers of a language, have also been widely commented -
upon(Pica'lgg4'|gg7).Long(1983,1992.1996)hasarguedthatinteractional
modifications such as clarification requests and recasts, ale more consistently present
than are input modifications (e.g., linguistic simplification) in interaction between native
and nonnative speakers and that the nature of interactional modifications as attention-
focusing devices is what makes them likely to be helpful for acquisition. Gass and
Varonis (1994) have proposed that interaction serves to focus leamers' attention on form
in instances where there is perceived diffrculty in communicating, "raising to awaxeness
that area of a leamer's grarnmar that deviates (either productively or receptively) from
native speaker usage." swain (1985, 1993; Swain & Lapkin, 1995) has proposed that one
reason leamers in immersion contexts exhibit weaknesses in gfammatical accuracy even
after receiving years of comprehensible input is that they are not called upon to produce
much, arguing that ,.producing the target language may be the trigger thal forces the
leamer to pay attention to the means of expression needed in order to successfully convey
his or her own intent" (1985, p. 249).
If all these accounts are conect, attention is a crucial construct for SLA. Attention is
the pivot point at which lcamer-intemal factors (including aptitude, motivation, curent
L2 knowledge, and processing ability) and leamer-extemal factors (including the
complexity of input, discoursal and interactional context, instructional treatrnent' and task
characterisrics) come together. What then happens within attentional space determines
language development, including the growth of knowledge (establishment ofnew
representations), fluency (access to that knowledge), and variation.
However, it could be argued that attention in these accounts is merely a deus ex
machina that does not actually explain anything. At the least, one must wonder whether a
unitary conoept of attention based on ordinary experience or folk psychology can be thc
explanalion of so many varied phenomena. To gain a better understanding of what
attention is and how it works, it is necessary to tum to psychology, where attention has
been a major focus of theory and empirical research for over a century, and to examine
some ofthe assumptions, definitions, metaphors, theoretical disputes, and empirical
findings from that field.
ATTENTION IN PSYCHOLOGY: SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
ln psychology. the basic assumptions concerning attention have been that it is limited,
that it is seleotive, that it is partially subiect to voluntary control, that attention controls
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access to consciousness, and that attention is essential for action control and for leaming.
All of these basic points were raised early on. The classic work on attention is that of
William James (1890), who noted that "Everyone knows what attention is. It is the
taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, ofone out of what seem several
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration of
consciousness, are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal
more effectively with others" (p. 403). The nature and mechanisms of attention tumed
out not to be so self-evident, however, and the topic continues to be discussed within an
enonnous literature, most of which is experimentally based.
Attention b Llmited
I'he classic view in psychology is that limited capacity is the primary characteristic of
attention (Broadbent, 1958; Kahneman, 1973), and this view has been taken on by many
in SLA (Mclaughlin, Rossman, & Mcleod, 1983; VanPatten, 1994). Within this general
view, some have stressed that there are two general human information processing
systems. Such accounts contrast effortful, attention-demanding ("controlled") processes
with capacity-free ("automatic") processes (Shiftin & Schncider, 1977). Another variant
of the basic notion of capacity limitations in attention is that of Wickens (1980, 1984),
who proposed multiple, specilic resource pools for processing stages, brain hemispheres,
and modalities (visual, auditory, vocal, manual). This model accoutlts for the fact that
attention-demanding activities can be carried out at the same time more easily if they call
upon different modalities than if they draw upon the same modality. ln other words, there
is some flexibility to capacity limitations, though each resource pool is assumed to have
limited capacity.
Since the 1960's, when computers with limited memory systems began to come into
widespread use, the primary metaphor for the limited capacity notibn of attention has
been memory (CPU). Another inlluential variant of the limircd capacity metaphor for
attention was influenced by psychoanalysis; Kihlstrom (1984) proy'osed that "effort"
(analogous to Freud's libido) was thc limited rresourse.
Attention is Selective
In the classic account of attcntion, the common view is that a sdcond characteristic of
attetrtion, that it is selective, is a corollary of limited capacity. Bedause therc is a limited
supply of attention and because any activity that draws upon it will interfere with other
activities requiring it, attention must b€ strategically allocated. Tile basic metaphor here
is economic (Shaw & Shaw, l97E). Whcn resources are limited, d cost-benefit analysis
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determines the focus of attention. VanPatten has drawn upon this metaphor in SLA,
arguing that what is important in most SLA contexts is the meaning of messages, so
limited attentional resources are directed first as those elements that carry message
meaning (primarily lexicon) and only later (when the cost comes down) towards
communicatively redundant formal features of language (VanPatten, 1990, 1994; Lee,
Cadierno, Glass, & VanPatten, 1997).
ln the selective attention literature, the most cnduring controversy has been whether -
selection happens early or late in processing. One influential early view held that
attending to one message eliminated perception ofanother (Broadbent, 1958)' The
metaphor here is that of a filter, gate, or bottle-neck. l,ater findings showing that
individuals process highly meaningful words outside an attended channel (for example, in
dichotic listening studi€s, in which different messages are played to the two ears) led
some researchers to make the suong assumption that all information in the input stream is
perceptually processed and that selection happens late (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963).
Whetler or not early selection occurs is still controversial (LaBerge, 1995), but more
recent work in psychology has moved away from this issue and from the notion of
selection as a corollary of limited capacity, identiffing selection itself as the basic
function of aftention and emphasizing that selection may have other functions in addition
to the allocation of scarce resources. Treisman ( 1992) argues that visual attention serves
to integrate the features that belong to the same visual object, that is, to coalesce the
properties ofan object into a coherent perceptual representation (see also Shapiro, Arnell,
and Raymond, 1997). Within the language acquisition field, Bialystok (1994) has also
emphasized the importance of selection ("control" in her framework) rather than limited
capacity as the primary characteristic of attention.
Aflention is Subjecl to Volunlory Control
LaBerge (1995) emphasizes the importance of preparatory attention, which includes
such things as being ready to step on the gas when a traffic light turns green or waiting to
applaud at the exact moment the last sound of a musical performance ends. The benefits
of preparatory attention include accuracy in perceptual judgment and categorization, as
well as accuracy and speed in planning and performing actions. More generally, we can
choose 1o pay attention to one stimulus (or some feature ofa stimulus) over another, and a
geat deal of language teaching practice is founded on the premise that learners can attend
to different aspects ofthe target language and that one ofthe important functions of
teaching is to help focus leamers' attention. Hulstijn and Hulstijn (1984) have suggested
that cenain tasks can be repeated. with the teacher telling them each time to pay attention
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to ditTcrent lbatures. such as grammar, pronunciation, rate of speech, completeness of
information, and so on.
The idea that we can control the focus of attention is an ancient one, often equated
with the soul or will. In the l9th century, Wundt and James were the most prominent
proponents of this view of attention (Neumann, 1996), while recognizing as well that
there is also a passive, involuntary form of attention. F-or example, one attends to a loud
noise, whether one wants to or not. In the well-known Stroop effect, the printed name of
a color word like "red" or "green" tends to interfere with the ability to name the color ink
in which the word is printed, e.g., "brown," when the word "red" is printed in brown ink
(Dalrymple-Alford & Budayr, 1966). Involuntary attention is data driven, elicited
bottom-up. Voluntary attention is top-down in the sense that attention is directed to
outside events by inner intentions.
Anenlion Conlrols Access lo Consciousness
To quote William James again, "My experience is what I agree to attend to" (1890, p.
403). The idea that one of the roles of attention (whether voluntary or involuntary) is to
control access to consciousness is an old one (Baars, 1988, pp. 301-324; Shapiro, Amell,
& Raymond, 1997). Ever since Aristotle described the phenomenon ofselective
attention, consciousness (awareness) has been equated with the phenomena of limited
capacity and selective access. Descartes assumed that selectivity occurred at a specific
place, the pineal gland, between thc mechanical brain processes shared with all animals
and higher mental processes that are unique to humans. The idea that attention and
awareness are essentially two sidcs of the same coin played a proririnent role in most l gth
century theorizing in psychology. For Wundt, the focus of consciousness was determined
by the direction of attention, what he called apperception. Theodpre Ziehen argued
against Wundt's concept of apperception, but also identified atterltion with access to
awareness. in Ziehen's model, attentional selection was based on competition.
Sensations and latent (nonconscious) ideas compete for access to consciousness (a very
contemporary view). Only the most strongly activated ideas and their associated
sensations actually enter consciousness; those that do not rcmain [nconscious and have
no effect at all. A modem version of these ideas is that of Marcdl (1983), who identifies
focal attention as the mechanism that contlols access to awareneds and establishes the
boundary between an early processing stage that produces nonco scious rcpresenlations
ofall stimuli in a purely bottom-up manncr and a higher state offhenomenal experience
which consists of the imposition ofa particular interpretation, a donstructive act.
Neisser's (1967) model of attcntion was similar, in the sense that he viewed the essential
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function of focal attention in terms ofa constructive, synthetic activity (largely driven by
top-down processes such as expectations) that makes stimuli available for further
analysis. (See Neumann, 1996, for an cxcellent historical account of these views.)
Similar views are prominent in the major research paradigms that have been used in
psychology to investigat€ attention. In reviewing two independent research traditions,
one rooted in filter theory and largely investigated through dichotic listening studies, the
other based on paradigrns from visual information processing, Neumann (1990, 1996) -
identifred the following assumptions in common:
1. Selection is the mechanism that moves information from one stage ofprocessing to a -
subsequent stage;
2. The locus of selection is situated between the unlimited-capacity and the limited-
capacity portions of the information processing system;
3. Selected stimuli are reprcsented in conscious awateness, and unsclected stimuli are
not so represented.
The predominant metaphor of this view of selcction as access to consciousness is that
of the spotlight or zoom lens (Baars, 1996; Eriksen & St. James, l9E6; Posner &
Peterson, 1990). various SLA theorists have also stressed the role of attention as the
process that brings things into awareness' Bialystok has proposed a model of the
development of L2 proficiency built around two cognitive processing components, called
analysis and control. Analysis is the procesS by which intemal, formal representations are
constructed. Relatively unanalyzed fepresentations (e.g., formulaic chunks useful for
conversational purposes) gradually evolve into more analyzed representations which are 
-r
required to support higher literacy skills. Control refers to access to these representations,
the basis of fluency. For Bialystok ( 1994), awareness (consciousness) is the result of an
interaction between analysis and conhol; the process of focusing attention onto intemal
rcpresentations "gives rise to the subjective feeling of awareness that has been called
consciousness" G. 165).
Atlention is Essential lor Acllon Control
The essential contrast here is between novice behavior, for which controlled
processing is required, and expert behavior, which can be carried out either automaticallv
(without attention) or mostly automatically with only a controlled assist at critical
decision points (Reason, 1984). Schneidei and Detweiler (1988) have proposed a model
in which automatization is viewed as a gradual, continuous transition through five
identifiable phrases: fully controlled processing, context-maintained controlled
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comparison, goal-state-maintained controlled comparison, controlled assist of automatic
processing, and fully automatic processing.
Allenlion is Essential lor Learning
'fhe orthodox position in psychology is that there is linle if any learning without
anention (Carlson & Dulany, 1985; Fisk & Schneider, 1984; Kihlsrom, l9g4; Logan,
1988; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Posner, 1992; Shiftin & Schneider, 1977; Velmans,
l99l). This claim is often related to models of memory. It is argued that unatrended
stimuli persist in immediate short-term memory for only a few seconds at best, and
attention is the necessary and sufficient condition for long-term memory storage to occur.
ln sLA as well, the claim has becn made frequently that attention to input is necessary for
input to become intake that is available for further mental processing (Can & Cun"an,
1994; Gass, 1997; van Lier, 1991, 1994; VanPatten, 1994; Schmidr, 1995).
FROM METAPHORS TO MECHANISMS
Metaphors (attention as economic rcsource, pipelinc, gate, executive, or spotlight) are
useful and often drive research programs, but are pre-theoretic, whereas mechanisms seek
to be explanatory. In a widely read article in SLA, Tomlin and Villa (1994) have drawn
upon the work ofPosner (1994; Posner & Peterson, 1990) to identi! three mechanisms
or subsystems of attention, each with identifiable neurological correlates: alertness,
orientation, and detection.
A le rtness vs. O r ie ntal io n
In Posner's account of attention, orienting rcfcrs to commining anendonal resources to
sensory stimuli. In earlier accounts (Pavlov, 1927), orienting was traditionally studied as
a reflexive response (e.9., attending involuntarily to a loud noise), and Posner comments
that the orienting system responds to involuntarily processed stimuli during early visual
processing, but for Posner the esscntial characteristic of orienting is the alignment process
itself (attributed to the posterior cortex), not whcther such alignnlent is votuntary or
involuntary. Orientation can therefore be modulated by a sccond aftentional subsystem,
the alertness or executive attontional system (in the mid-frontal lbbe;, which maintains a
state ofvigilance to increase the rate at which high priority inforlnation can be detected in
the service of current goals.
Tomlin and Villa argue that both orientation and alertress a{e important in SLA.
Alertness is related to motivation, interest in the L2, and classrobm readiness to leam.
t3
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Orientation is related to such instructional techniques as input-flooding and VanPatten's
notion of attention to form: "that is, the leamer may bias attentional resources to
linguistic form, increasing the likelihood of detecting formal distinctions but perhaps at
the cost of failing to detect other components of input utterances" (Tomlin & Villa, 1994,
p.199).
Detection : Non-consclous Registation vs. Conscious Perception
For Tomlin and Villa, both orientation and alertness enhance tie likelihood of
detection, but it is detection itseli the cognitive registration of stimuli (mapped to an
anterior attention network that includes the anterior cingulate gyrus and nearby motor
areas), that is the necessary and sufficient condition for further processing and learning'
Tomlin and Villa stress that, in their view, detection is not equivalent to awareness' It is
therefore necessary to distinguish between detection without awareness (for which
"registration" seems a non-controversial choice of labels) and detection within focal
attention accompanied by awareness (conscious perception or noticing). 
_
Making this distinction, unfortunately, immediately raises some thomy
methodological issues:
1. How can we know whether some stimulus (or a feature of it) has been attended? -
2. How can we know whether some stimulus (or a feature of it) has been consciously
noticed? -r
3. How can we know whether some stimulus (or a feature of il) has been registered,
even if not attended or noticed? 
-ir
Evidence that some part of target language input has or has not been attended to and
noliced is sometimes available from learner productions (in either naturalistic or
classroom settings), as in the following exchange reported by VanPatten (1990): -
lnterviewer: C6mo estAn ellos? (How are they?)
Subject: Son contento. (They are happy.)
Interviewer: Y ellos, c6mo estdn? (And them, how are they?)
Subject: Son contento tambi6n. (They are happy too.)
VanPatten argues that in the above example the leamer was so intent on meaning. that
features in the input (verb choice between ser and estar) that were not crucial to meaning .r
were neither attended nor noticed.
Learner reports, for example in diary studies, provide another source of information
aboul what leamers pay attention to and notice. Schmidt and Frota (1986) reported the
results of a diary study in which there were so many instances of L2 use matching the
leamer's reports of what had been noticed in input (in interaction with native speakersl
THE CENTRALITY OF ATTENTION IN SLA
that the study supported the hypothesis that there is no language learning without
attention and noticing. on the other hand, warden, Lapkin, Swain, and Hart ( 1995)
lound no particular relationship between the quantity and quality of linguistic
observations recorded by high school students of French in their joumals during a
summer exchange program and their progress as reflected in test scores. This might be
because some leamers found their language observations more wonhy ofreport than did
others, but as Tomlin and Villa point out, the essential weakness ofdiary studies is that
their temporal granularity is too coarse: "Diary studies encompass spans of time as large
as several weeks, but the cognitive processing ofL2 input takes place in relatively brief
spans of time, seconds or even parts of seconds" ( 1994, p. I g5).
Leow (1997) has used data from think-aloud protocols produced by leamers of
Spanish completing a problem-solving task (an L2 crossword przzls) 1s gather finer-
grained data and to distinguish between two levels ofawareness illustrated below by two
responses to the same item (the stem changing v erb mintieron): simple noticing
(registration with awarcness indicated by a report or rcpetition) and noticing with
metalinguistic awareness:
Simple noticing:
"...the opposite ofzo, so it is supposed.to be si so I I across is gonna be
mintieron (ftlls in mintieron)"
Noticing with metalinguistic awareness:
"... now let's see where is number l7 down? oh se durmieron, con awilha
u...repetir, ellos repitieron? I think it has a stcm change,25 down ir,
yes!...four down would be lu, so durmi6 (wites in durmi6\ done cool, I like
this. Number 5 ellos of pedir, that asked, pdreron and it's goqd ... nine is
gonna be si again mintieron aidobviously I spelled number I ll wrong so I can
fix that (changes me ieron to minlieron)"
This technique appears to have been successful in distinguishing between wo levels of
awareness (those who showed higher levcls of awareness leamed more than those whose
protocols showed that they merely attended and noticed), but it is difficult to see how
such techniques could show that subjects did aor attend or notice bomething, since verbal
reports (even when concurent) cannot be assumed to include evelything that is noticed.
Jourdenais, Ota, Stauffer, Boyson, and Doughty (1995) havc alsolused think-aloud
protocols to see whether learncrs in a focus-on-form instructional treatment (target items
were textually enhanced) would notice and leam morc than subjects in a comparison
group. Enhancemenl participants did notice more target forms and did produce more
l
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target featues in production, but once again the methodology cannot identiry examples of
target featues that were not noticed but might have been non-consciously registered
In computer-assisted leaming contexts, instructional treatments can be designed to
focus leamers' attention on crucial aspects of input, and the success of such efforts can be
assessed not only through leamers' reports of what they notice (Chapelle, 1998) but also
with programs that track the interface between user and program, for example by
recording mouse clicks and eye movements (Crosby, 1998). However, these records can
provide information only about orientation, while detection remains invisible.
Nevertheless, it is possible to operationalize the distinction between non'conscious
registration and conscious noticing within focal attention in some experimental settings.
Merikle and Cheesman (19E7) have introduced a distinction between the objective and
subjective thresholds ofpcrception. The clearest evidence that something has been
consciously perceived or noticed (exceeded the subjective threshold) is a verbal report of
awareness or recall. However, many have argued that it is unreasonable to assume that
the absence of a verbal report means that something was not noticed, since verbal
reporting requires reflexive self-description and adequate language to describe what is
noticed. One might reasonably claim to have noticed or consciously perceived a
particular feature ofa regional accent ofEnglish, without being able to describe it -
accuately or to reproduce it very accurately. A less demanding but more reasonable
criterion for awareness is above chance performance in a forced-choice recognition test. 
-r
For example. if subjects are presented with a scries ofutlerances in Spanish and
immediately afterwards forced to identif the verb form, preterit or imperfective, that 
_
occurred in each utterance and can do so, that is reasonable evidence that they noticed
them, at least in cases where it is possible to be sure that they were not generated from
intemal knowledge. More importantly, if subjects cannot identif, which lbrms occurred -
in input with better than chance accuracy, that is much stronger evidence for the absence
of noticing than their inability to produce them. lf it can be shown (using more indirect
measures) that these subjects did, neverlheless, register or detect the forms that they
cannot identiry in a recognition test, then we would have a strong case for pre-attentive,
unconscious registration.
One widely accepted indirect measure of registration is priming, the facilitation of
responses to one stimulus by the prior presentation ofa related stimulus. Marcel (1983)
showed that subliminally presented words that subjects could not consciously see could
prime semantic associates. Eich (19E4) reported dichotic listening experiments in which
pairs of words were both presented to the unsttended ear. one of which was ambiguous
(e.g., fair or.farc) while the other biased its less common interpretation (e.g., taxi).
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Recognition ofboth members ofthe pair was poor (indicating that the subjective
threshold of perception was not exceeded), but in a spelring test subjects were biased in
the direction ofthe disambiguated meaning (indicating that the objecrive threshord of
perception had been reached). However, these studies used welr-known native rang,,ags
words, reaving unanswered the qucstion ofwhether novel materiar (such as foreign
language input) can be unconsciousry registered in a sim ar fashion. Before turning to the
evidence for this possibility, it is necessary to discuss two additionar mechanisms of
attention.
Facilltation vs. Inhib ition
The theories discussed so far have assumed that attention directly faciritates or
enhances processing (LaBerge, r 995). Automatic processing is assumed up to some
level. Attention then intervenes, enabring serected information to receive funher
processing (Neill, valdes, & Terry, 1995), and ignored stimuli are not processed further(van der Heijden, l98l ). However, there is a logical alternative. The mechanism of
attention might instead inhibit, brock, or suppress the proccssing of inelevant
information, so that processing of relevant information simply proceeds without
interference from inelevant information.
The inhibition construct played an important role in early psychological theories
(Hamishfeger, 1995). Luria (1961) for example, demonstrated a developmental sequence
of action control via verbal regulation. very young children are not able to guide their
own behavior by inhibiting irrelevant behavior either through external or intemal speech.
Later, toddlers become capable of using extemal verbal commands to direct their
behavior, yet they continue to be unable to regulate their bchavior with their own verbal
instructions (intemal or aloud). However, until recently most psychological models paid
little attention to inhibition. Inhibition was totally igrored by behaviorists, and during the
period in which cognitive psychology was dominated by information-processing models,
inhibitory mechanisms were not seen as particularly useful (Hamishfeger, 1995)
Selective attention probably cannot be onty an inhibition mechanism, because outside
of laboratory experiments therc are just too many things that would have to be inhibited.
However, resistance to interference from potentially attention-capturing processes is
clearly important in understanding many real life phenomena, such as school children
who cannot keep their attention on class, adults with obsessive-corhpulsive disorder (who
cannot inhibit the intrusion of unwelcome thoughts), and older adrllts with Alzheimer's
disease (Kane, Hasher, Stolzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994). Considerable evidence has
l7
accumulated in support of the suppression position in general (Tipper, 1985; Tipper &
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Baylis, 1987; Tipper & cranston, 1985), and research on inhibitory processes is probably
the most active and theor€tically interesting work within attention theory at the present
time. The reasons for lhis probably include the growing preference among cognitive
psychologists for the brain metaphor rather than the computer metaphor, the impact of 
-
studies relating the frontal cortex to resistance and interference, and connectionist models
in which simple processing units send both excitatory and inhibitory signals to each other
@orklund & Hamishfeger, 1995; Dempster, 1995)'
Evidence for facilitation and inhibition effects comes fiom positive and negative
priming phenomena, respectively. Suppose that a subject must attend and respond to one
source of information, ignoring another and, subsequently, must unexpectedly respond to
the jusr-ignored information or to entirely new information. According to facilitation
theories, the effects of the igrored object dissipate over time, but if those effects have not
dissipated completely, then processing of the previously ignored object should show an
advantage over completely new information (positive priming). lf, however, if the
processing of ignored information is inhibitcd when processing attended infbrmation,
subsequent processing of the ignored information must overcome any persistence of that
inhibition (negative priming). Igrrored (inhibited) information should be more diffrcult
to process than new information (Neill, Valdes, & Terry' 1995)' -
Negative priming has been demonstrated in a great variety of selective-attention tasks.
For example, research on lexical ambiguity has foeused heavily on the question of 
-
whether sentence context is able to constrain processing only to the meaning that is
appropriate in the context, or whether multiple meanings become activated in all 
-
contexts. Data supporting the latter view (temporary non-conscious activation of multiple
meanings) are frequently cited as evidence for the modularity oflexical processing,
However, Simpson and Kang (1994) and Yee ( 1991) report recent studies that are
concerned with the fate ofmeanings after the processing ofan ambiguous word has
presumably run its course, reporting several sfudies showing that one meaning ofan
ambiguous word is suppressed following the selection ofthe other for a response.
CAN THERE BE LEARNING WITHOUT ATTENTION?
It is necessary to deconstruct this question somewhat in order to find the essential
issues, since different variants of the question may well have different answers. For
example, one might paraphrase the question as "ls it necessary to pay attention, -
deliberately, to some aspect of second language input in order to learn it?," with a focus
on intentionality, alertness, and voluntary orienting to specific stimuli. Because we know -
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that attention can be involuntarily anracted to stimuli or stimulus leatures (involuntary
orienting), it cannot be claimed that leamers musl intentional/y focus their attention on
each particular aspect of L2 input in order to learn it.a Even if it is true that in order to
leam anything one must attend to it, that does not entail that il is necessary to have either
the intention to attend or the intention to leam. On the other hand, since we know that
preparatory atlention and voluntary orienting vastly improve encoding (LaBerge, 1995;
Cowan, 1995) and since many features of L2 input are likely to be infrequent, non-salient.
and communicatively redundant, intentionally focused attention may be a practical
(though not theoretical) necessity for successful language learning. Language learners
who take a totally passive approach to leaming, waiting patiently and depending on
involuntary attentional processes to trigger automatic noticing, are likely to be slow and
unsuccessful leamers.
Another way to paraphrase the question is to ask whether all aspects ofL2 input must
be attended in order to learn them, or whether some kind ofglobal attention to input is
suffioient. For example, is it sufficient for attention to be focused on meaning, with
message form picked up without any attention to it (Paradis, I 994), or is Gass ( I 997)
conect in arguing that apperceived input that is processed only semantically (for example.
with the help of non-linguistic cues, isolated lexical items, and contextual expectations)
and receives no syntactic processing will not lead to development of syntax? Is it the case
that nothing is free, that in order to acquire phonology, one must attend to the sounds of
target language input; in order to acquire pragmatics, one must attend to both the
linguistic form of utterances and the relevant contextual features; in order to acquire L2
syntax one must attend to the order of words and the meanings they are associated with
(Schmidt, 1990, 1993b, 1995)? It has been suggested that asp€cts of language may differ
in their attentional requirements; perhaps learning lexicon and morphology require
anention in ways that leaming syntax does not (VanPatten, 1994; Schwartz, 1993).
Based on a review of vocabulary leaming studies with amnesics, Ellis (1994b) concludes
that attention (but not awareness) is necessary and sufficient for learning the percepnral
aspects of novel word form, while leaming word meanings requires both attention and
explicit awareness.
The psychological literature provides less help in resolving thib question than some
others concerning attention, because rclatively few studies have assessed the effects of
focusing attention on different features of stimulus sets (as opposed to dividing or sharing
l9
' We also know that leamers are not frec to allocate their attention wherever they wish. vanPanen ( 1990)
has carried out €xperim€nts showing that l€amers hav€ grcat difficulty in anen{ing to both form and content
simultaneously, although they need to do both in order to map form and meanirtg, the essential task of
language lcaming.
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attention between two sourccs of stimuli). The few studies that address this issue suggesl
that stimulus attributes are filtered by attention and only those that are relevant to the -r
experimental task and receive attention are represented in stored instances (Logan,
Taylor, & Etherton, 1996). This is sufficient gounds to motivate an attentionally
determined encoding specificity hypothesis for SLA, but insufficient to settle the issue,
which clearly requires research within SLA itself, focused on different domains of
language. -t
The question of whether global attention to L2 input might be sufftcient is also
reflected in the sentiment expressed by many SLA researchers that many features of -
language could not possibly be attended to, because they are too subtle and abstract
(Sharwood Smith, lntemet posting to PsYCHE-B@listserve.uh.edu, I l/3/97). If these 
-t
features of language are taken to be those t}at modem linguistic theory makes explicit-
such as abstract principles of govemment, constraints on movement, and the like-then
this must surely be true, since many of tlese are unrecognizable in any conscious way
simply by anending to input. On the other hand, assuming that abstract grarnmars of the
tlpe described by linguists are what L2 learners acquire (itselfnot an uncontroversial -
assumption), it may well be necessary for leamers to attend to the evidence for these
principles, including the presence of morphological material, the order of elements, and ':
the ways in which specific utterances map onto meanings. That is, the issue may be
resolved in terms ofthe distinction made at the beginning ofthis paper between attention 
-
to utterances as distinct from an understanding of abstract rules or principles.
Another way to resolve this issue is suggested by Sharwood Smith's (1994) 
-
distinction between competence, held to be elusive, intuitive, and essentially
subconscious, and the on-line production and reception processes of actual language
performance. Sharwood Smirh gives as an example the position of a verb in a sentence. 
qt
As far as competence is concemed. there is no rule as such for positioning a verb. lts
position falls out from some general principles of univcrsal grammar which prevent it
from going anywhere but its one position. However, language processing takes place in
real time, so a verb (whose position in the structue of a sentence may not be govemed by
a rule) must be positioned appropriately (by a rule or routine) in real time utterances
generated by a language processor. In order to establish such routines. attention must be 
-
allocated to the order of elements (sequences) in both input-processing and in production.
Probably the most interesting variant ofthe question of whether attention is necessary
for learning in all cases concerns detection in Tomlin and Villa's sense and the distinction -
that can be made between nonconscious registration and conscious perception.
"noticing," or-in Tomlin and Villa's terms "detection within selective attention." '-r
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Tomlin and villa's claim that detection is necessary for leaming bui that detection need
not result in awareness is somewhat anticlimactic, since it is self-evidently true that some
aspect of language that is not registered in any sense will not lead to leaming. The most
interesting question, and the hardest to answer conclusively, is whether selection
accompanied by awareness is necessary, or whether pre-consciously detected information
is sufficient for leaming.
There is evidence for the cognitive registration of stimuli without focal attention or
awareness, both from subliminal perception studies and from studies using measures of
implicit memory to establish the registration of unattended information (schmidt, 1990,
l99la, 1994a, 1994b, 1995). These studies clearly show cognirive activarion (for about a
tenth of a second) of previously well-learned information present in long term memory.
However, the vast majority of these studies do not show leaming of anything new. On
the basis of this distinction, I have proposed a strong version of the "noticing hypothesis,"
a claim that while there is subliminal perception, there is no subliminal learning.
Several types ofstudies have the potential to falsifu this claim, but each entails
methodological difficulties. The most straight-forward would be to demonstrate the
existence of subliminal leaming directly, either by showing positive priming of
unattended and unnoticed novel stimuli or by showing leaming in dual task studies in
which central processing capacity is exhausted by a primary task. The problem with
positive priming studies is that one can never really be sure that subjects did not have at
least fleeting awareness of what they could not report (Deschepper & Treisman, 1996;
Merikle & Daneman, 1995). The problem with dual task experiments is that one cannot
be sure that no aftention is devoted to the secondary task, and in experiments using this
paradigm, selective attention procedures vary considerably in the ei<tent to which they
permit or even prompt subjects to divide attention between two information sources
rather than focusing exclusively on one (Greenwald, 1992). Schachter, Rounds, Wright,
and Smith (1996) have reported leaming of complex WH-questions in a "nonattentional"
condition. However, subjects in this condition were required to read the target structure
sentences out loud while performing on-line a substitution ofan earlier seen word for its
synonym in the target sentence. Since reading aloud requires anention to the sequence of
words and Schachter et al. defrne the leaming task as one of serial' leaming, it is very
diffrcult to accept the claim that this was truly a nonattentional copdition. If not-and
both Schachter et al. and Cunan and Keele (1993) cornment that their use of
"nonattentional" does not mean that no attention at all is devoted towards the secondary
task-then the results are compatibl€ with the idea that performa4ce under conditions of
divided attention results in some leaming (though less than in sinlle task leaming) as
2l
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long as the competing task does not complete deplete attentional resources. The general
point is that both types of demonstration, positive priming and dual task leaming, are
likely to be contaminated by conscious processes.
Jacoby, Lindsay, and Toth (1992) have argued that the trick in demonstrating 
-.
nonattentional leaming is to use the logic of opposition, to alrange experiments in which
unconscious processes oppose the aims of conscious processes' DeSchepper and
Treisman (1996) have recently used ihis logic to produce what may be the most solid -1
demonsEation to date of unattended leaming, using an experimental paradigm devised by
Rock and Gutrnan ( l98l ). Rock and Gutman presented two overlapped nonsense shapes
and asked subjects to attend to one of them (e.g., the green one, not the red one) and rate
it for aesthetic quality. After a series oftrials, they gave participants a surprise
recognition test, found that recognition was at chance, and concluded that attention is
needed to form new representations of shape. DeSchepper and Treisman's innovation
was to add an implicit memory measr[e (response time) to the paradignr and to
restructwe the experimental procedure based on an inhibition mechanism model of
attention. After a series oftrials in which subjects attended to green shapes (ignoring red -
ones), target and distracter were reversed, i.e., a shape that previously appeared in red
(distracter) now appeared in green (target). DeSchepper and Treisman report that a
previously ignored shapes were subsequently responded to more slowly than control
shapes (never before exposed). This can only be accounted for by assuming that '.
representations of these unattended novel shapes were formed in memory.
One could perhaps argue that the "una$ended" shapes in these experiments were in 
-
fact attended and briefly noticed before being suppressed or that inhibition is by
definition an attentional mechanism. However, it would be unwise to make such
arguments, tbr this would raise the question of whether the noticing hypothesis could evcr =
be falsified. Is seems, therefore, that there is now some good evidence for representation
and storage in memory of unattended and not noticed novel stimuli.
There are limitations to these findings, however, that make it questionable how
relevant such leaming could be for SLA. The effect has been found so far only with
visual perception and only when ignored stimuli compete directly and strongly for
attention, which is generally not the case with second language input. There was no build
up of memory strength with multiple presentation in the distracter role, making it unlikely
that preconsciously established traces ggadually build in strength until they are finally
noticed. Not all subjects showed negative priming, suggesting strategy differences, but
for those subjects who did demonstrate negative priming, a single act of attention was
sufficienl to change from inhibition to facilitation, which is necessary ifknowledge is to -
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CONCLUSIONS
Like most psychological constructs based initially on cornmon experience, attention
does not refer to a single mechanism but to a variety of mechanisms or subsystems,
including alertness, orientation, detection within selective attention, facilitation, and
inhibition. what these have in common (and do not share with the mechanisms of
unattended, preconscious registration) is the function of controlling information
processing and behavior when existing skills and routines are inadequate (Neumann,
1996). Leaming in the sense of establishing new or modified knowledge, memory, skills
and routines is therefore largely a side effect of attended processing. people learn about
the things they attend to and do not leam much if anything about the things they do not
attend to (Logan, Taylor, & Etherton, 1996).
The question of whether a// learning requires attention remains problematic, and
conceptual issues and methodological problems have combined to make a definitive
answer illusive, even after a century of psychological experimentation. If the issue is
seen as one of intention or the voluntary orientation of attention onto stimuli, the answer
seems to be that intention is not a requirement. However, because goals and motivation
are such important determinants of the focus on attention (Baars, 1986), paying deliberate
attention to less salient or redundant aspects ofL2 input may be a practical necessity.
Since task demands are an equally important determinant of attentional focus,
be available for use. This study did not assess subject awareness, but orher studies have
and the generar finding is that unaware subjects show negative priming ofignored
stimuli, while aware subjects show facilitation (Driver & Baylis, 1993; Hasher, Stolzfus,
''acks. 
& Rympa, r99r; Neiil & Vardes, 1992). Similar effects have been found in other
studies contrasting conscious and unconscious perception (Merikle & Daneman, lgg5).
Unconsciously perceived stimuli can influence affective reactions; when the same stimuri
are consciousry perceived, these reactions are neutralized. Unconsciously perceived
stimuli lead to automatic reactions; consciously perceived stimuri alow subjects to
modifr their reactions.
However interesting the finding of storage of nonconsciously stored novel
information is theoreticarly, therefore, it appears to be of littre benefit in language
leaming' ln fact, if we are less able to access previousry ignored than never-before-
encountered information' we might have an explanation not for deveropment in language
leaming but for nonlearning, habituation of the self-instruction to ignore something.
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instructional practices that focus leamers' attention on things that they are less 
likely to
attend to or notice on their own also have a solid justification'
IfthefocusofinquiryisonwhatspecificallyinL2inputmustbeattended'thereisa
con{lictbetweentheencodingspecificityhypothesis,whichclaimsthatonlythose
stimulus attributes that are attended to in processing are encoded ([ogan, Taylor' &
Etherton,1996),whichimplicsthatwhateverevidenceinL2inputisrelevanttoa
particular leaming domain must b€ attended' and the view that some aspects of L2 input
are so subtle and abstract that they cannoi possibly be attended to' The solution proposed
in this paper is that attention must bc directed to whatever evidence is relevant for a
parricular problem domain, i.e., that attcntion must be sPecificatly focused and notjust
global, but that no abstract understanding of the signifrcance ofthe evidence is required
(although such understanding may be facilitative)'
Finally, the important issuc of whether there can be any leaming (as opposed to
activation of known information) on the basis of unattended, subliminal processing
remains recalcitrant. some recent evidence has been presented for it, but many
psychologists have exprcssed the opinion that this dispule will never be settled, because
zero-point questions are just not answerable (Baars, 1986; Merikle & Daneman, 1995).
Baars suggests that the important qucstion is not whether there can be any learning
without attention and conscious involvemcnt (unanswerable) but rather whether more
attention results in more learning, to which the answer is clearly that it does. Kellogg and
Dare (1989), who argue for both attended and unattended encoding, emphasize that while
their conclusion that unattended encoding is possible, this "does not imply that
unanended encoding has any practical value ... [since] the degree of elaboration resulting
from unattended encoding appears to be too limited to have any substantive influence on
human cognition or behavior" (P. 412).
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